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Abstract An information theoretical model for quantum secret sharing was in-
troduced by A. C. A. Nascimento et al.[Quantum Inf. Comput. Vol.5,1,205,68-
79(2003)], which was analyzed by quantum information theory. In this paper, we
analyze this information theoretical model using the properties of the quantum
access structure. By the analysis we propose a generalized model definition for
the quantum secret sharing schemes. In our model, there are more quantum ac-
cess structures which can be realized by our generalized quantum secret sharing
schemes than those of the previous one. In addition, we also analyse two kinds of
important quantum access structures to illustrate the existence and rationality of
the generalized quantum secret sharing schemes and consider the security of the
scheme by simple examples.
Keywords Quantum information · Quantum secret sharing · Access structure
1 Introduction
Secret sharing, introduced in Refs.[1,2], is an important cryptographic protocal
originally motivated by the need to distribute a piece of secret information (called
the secret) to a number of players in such a way that only certain subsets of play-
ers that form the access structure can collaboratively recover the secret while the
others cannot. Similarly, quantum secret sharing was first introduced by Hillery et
al. in Ref.[3], which is the natural extension of the classical protocol to the quan-
tum field. Quantum secret sharing is also a cryptographic protocol to distribute
a secret among a group of players P, such that only authorized subsets of P can
reconstruct the secret. While the secret in quantum schemes may be either an
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unknown quantum state or a classical one, in this case the players are comprised
of quantum systems and quantum communication is allowed between the dealer
and the players. After that, Cleve et al. proposed a ((k, n))-threshold quantum
scheme in Ref.[4]. Since then, there has been tremendous interest in developing
the quantum secret sharing because it has extensively practical applications in
cryptography and communication security. In recent years, lots of people devoted
to quantum secret sharing have given some nice results in this field. For example,
Gottesman showed that the size of each important share sometimes can be made
half of the size of the secret if quantum states are used to share a classical secret
[5]. The secret sharing with a single d-level quantum system was introduced by
Tavakoli et al. [6]. Vlad et al. proposed the generalized semiquantum secret shar-
ing schemes [7]. Zhang and Man considered a multiparty quantum secret sharing
protocol of the classical secret based on entanglement swapping of Bell states [8].
Some scholars give the quantum secret sharing schemes based on different princi-
ple, such as quantum error-correcting codes [9,10], local distinguishability [11] and
the product states [12]. In addition, there are also many quantum secret sharing
protocols which consider sharing quantum information[13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,
21,22].
In classical secret sharing, the information theory has played an important
role in designing and evaluating cryptographic primitives and protocols [23,24,
25]. It is a natural question to investigate the properties of their quantum me-
chanical counterparts. Some scholars have given the research on quantum secret
sharing based on the quantum information theory [26,27]. In Ref.[26], A. C. A.
Nascimento et al. proposed a quantum information theoretical model for quantum
secret sharing schemes. This model provides a unifying framework and new in-
sights for the theoretical study of quantum secret sharing. However, by analyzing
this model, we find that there are also some limitations in it. For example, due
to the special nature of quantum access structures, if the set A is unauthorized,
then we may find the complement of A is also an unauthorized set. At this time
we use the above model, and the secrecy condition cannot be satisfied. Thus it
leads to the question that there are a large number of quantum access structures
which cannot be realized by this quantum secret sharing schemes. This problem
is worth discussing whether there exists a more generalized model to characterise
quantum secret sharing. So it gives us a motivation to improve this scheme. In this
paper, we define a generalized model for quantum secret sharing and give some
important results of the generalized model. In addition, we analyze the existence
and rationality of the definition through two types of important quantum access
structures. Furthermore, we analyze the security of our scheme and it’s feasible.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we recall a few impor-
tant notations and give some preliminaries. In Section 3, we show some properties
for quantum access structures and analyze the model for quantum secret sharing
schemes in Ref.[26]. Furthermore, we define a generalized model and give some
important results. In Section 4 we present two types of quantum access structures
in order to analyze the existence and rationality of our definition. Finally, the
conclusion is given in Section 5.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Classical Secret Sharing Schemes
A secret sharing scheme is a method that enables a dealer D to share a secret S to
be protected among a set of players P so that only certain authorized groups are
able to recover the original secret, while the others cannot. The access structure
Γ ⊆ 2P consists of all subsets which can reconstruct the secret. Monotonicity is
a natural requirement of an access structure, that is, if A ∈ Γ and A ⊆ A′ then
A′ ∈ Γ . A classical secret sharing protocol realizing an access structure Γ is defined
by
(a) Recoverability requirement: for all A ∈ Γ , one has that H(S|SA) = 0, where
H(·) is the shannon entropy and SA denotes the secret that the members of the
set A hold.
(b) Secrecy requirement: for all A /∈ Γ , one has that 0 < H(S|SA) ≤ H(S).
Furthermore, a secret sharing scheme is perfect if the inequality in condition (b)
is replaced with H(S|SA) = H(S).
2.2 Quantum Access Structure and Hypergraph
In this section we briefly recall a few facts about quantum access structure and
hypergraph used in the paper; readers interested in a comprehensive introduction
to the hypergraph can refer to [28]. For the quantum secret sharing schemes, an
access structure, called a quantum access structure, will satisfy the requirement
that no two authorized sets are disjoint. In order to study the relationship between
the hypergraph and quantum access structures, we firstly recall the definition of
hypergraph.
A hypergraph H is a pair (V ;E) where V is a non-empty set of vertices and
E = {E1, . . . , Em} ⊆ 2V is a set of hyperedges. The hypergraph is said to be
connected if for any two vertices u, v ∈ V there exists a hyperpath from u to v
in H. We say two hypergraphs are isomorphic if there is a bijection between two
hypergraphs. Each quantum access structure, Γ ⊆ 2P , can be represented as a
hypergraph H = (P ;A) by letting each player being a vertex and each authorized
set being represented as an hyperedge in the hypergraph.
A hyperstar is a class of important hypergraphs. In Ref.[28], the hyperstar is
as follows.
Definition 1 A hypergraph H = (V ;E) is said to be a hyperstar if it satisfies
that A =
⋂
Ei∈E
Ei 6= Φ.
By Definition 1, we know that the hyperstar quantum access structures must be
quantum access structures.
2.3 Quantum Secret Sharing Schemes
An information theoretical model for quantum secret sharing was introduced by
A. C. A. Nascimento et al. in Ref.[26]. In this section we briefly recall this model.
One wants to share a quantum state ρS among a set of players P according to a
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given quantum access structure Γ ⊆ 2P . The quantum secret ρS is assumed to lie
in a m-dimensional Hilbert space HS for which the elements {|0〉, |1〉, . . . , |m− 1〉}
form an orthonormal basis. Thus the secret ρS can be represented by the quantum
mixture ρS =
∑m−1
i=0 pi|i〉〈i|. The reference system that purifies the state of S
is denoted by R with corresponding Hilbert space HR [29]. Finally, the secret is
shared among a set of players P = {P1, . . . , Pn} and HB is a Hilbert space in which
the subset B ⊆ P lives.
The model is defined as follows. we denote the quantum mutual information
between systems R and A by I(R : A) = S(A) + S(R)− S(RA), where S(A) is the
von Neumann entropy of the state ρA of system A [29].
Definition 2 A quantum secret sharing protocol realizing a quantum access struc-
ture Γ is a complete positive map which generates quantum shares from a quantum
secret ρS and distributes these shares among a set of players such that:
(a) For all A ∈ Γ , one has that I(R : A) = I(R : S).
(b) For all A /∈ Γ , one has that I(R : A) = 0.
3 A Generalized Model for Quantum Secret Sharing Schemes
In this section we show the central result of our paper, that is, how to establish
a generalized quantum secret sharing scheme for a quantum access structure. Our
model is better than the previous one because it can realize more quantum access
structures. First, we need to analyze the model mentioned in Definition 2. This
model has some advantageous features. It provides new insights into the theory
of quantum secret sharing and shows a nice perfection, that is, one has that I(R :
A) = 0 for all A /∈ Γ . Thus it means that the unauthorized sets have no information
about the secret. However, as the perfect condition is strict, this will induce that
the number of quantum access structures satisfying this requirement is so less. We
can take the simple ((3,4))-threshold quantum secret sharing scheme for instance.
Assuming that we take the unauthorized sets {P1P2} and {P3P4}, it is easy to
verify that they don’t meet the needs of the condition (b) in Definition 2. What’s
more, with the increase in the number of players in the quantum secret sharing
schemes, the number of these schemes satisfying Definition 2 will be less and less.
Before we give our theorem to analyse this problem, some necessary concepts
and symbols are shown as follows. In order to facilitate the following writing, the
empty set will be denoted by Φ. Given a set of players P and a quantum access
structure Γ on P. The complement of A is called the unauthorized set, denoted
by A = {Pi ∈ P| Pi /∈ A}, if A ⊆ P is an authorized set. The complement of Γ ,
called the adversary structure, is defined by A = {A ∈ 2P |A /∈ Γ and A 6= Φ}, a
family containing all unauthorized sets. Based on the special nature of quantum
access structure, we will divide the adversary structure A into two parts, that is
A = A1 ∪A2, where A1 = {A ∈ A | ∃ B ∈ Γ A ∩B = Φ} and A2 = {A ∈ A | ∀ B ∈
Γ A ∩B 6= Φ}. Obviously, it implies that A1 ∩A2 = Φ. At that time, we have that
the empty set Φ isn’t included in Γ and A.
Lemma 3 Let Γ ⊆ 2P be a general quantum access structure and let A = A1∪A2
denote the set of all unauthorized groups.
(i) If A ∈ A1, then A ∈ Γ .
(ii) If A ∈ A2, then A ∈ A2 ⊆ A.
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Proof. (i) If A ∈ A1, then by the definition of A1 there exists some B in Γ such
that A ∩ B = Φ. So it implies that (P − A) ∩ B = B, i.e., A ∩ B = B. Since the
knowledge of the set theory, it follows that B ⊆ A. As B is an authorized set and
the access structure is monotone, then it implies that A is also authorized, that
is, A ∈ Γ .
(ii) If A ∈ A2, then we have that A ∩ B 6= Φ for all B in Γ according to the
definition of A2. Firstly, our goal is to show that A ∈ A. Now assume that A /∈ A,
i.e., A ∈ Γ or A = Φ. If A = Φ, then we have that A = A = P ∈ Γ . This is in
contradiction with A ∈ A2. So A 6= Φ. Next we consider that A ∈ Γ . Since A ∈ A2,
then it follows that A∩B 6= Φ for all B in Γ . So we take the authorized set B = A
and it implies that A ∩ A = Φ. This is in contradiction with the definition of A2.
Hence A ∈ A holds. Secondly, we only need to prove that A∩B 6= Φ for all B ∈ Γ .
Suppose that A ∩ B = Φ, then it implies that A ∩ B = B, i.e., B ⊆ A. Therefore
it means that A is also authorized because B is an authorized set and the access
structure is monotone. Furthermore, this leads to a contradiction with A ∈ A2.
Hence we have that A ∩ B 6= Φ for all B in Γ . By the definition of A2, A ∈ A2
holds. The proof is completed. 
By Lemma 3, we obtain the following theorem for Definition 2 in the Ref.[26].
Theorem 4 Let Γ ⊆ 2P be a quantum access structure and let A = A1 ∪ A2
denote the set of all unauthorized sets. If A2 6= Φ, then there doesn’t exist a
perfect quantum secret sharing scheme realizing a quantum access structure Γ .
Proof. Due to the special nature of quantum access structures, that is, they must
satisfy the the no-cloning theorem, we can show the complement of unauthorized
sets are either authorized sets or unauthorized sets by Lemma 3. Suppose that
there exists a perfect quantum secret sharing scheme realizing a quantum access
structure Γ , we can find that A and A are the unauthorized sets, that is, A ∈ A2
and A ∈ A2. By Definition 2, we have that

I(R : A) = S(R) + S(A)− S(RA) = 0
I(R : A) = S(R) + S(A)− S(RA) = 0
(1)
Using the fact that the systems RS and RAA are in a pure state and the property
of the quantum entropy, it follows that S(A) = S(RA) and S(A) = S(RA). By the
above equations (1), we can obviously have that S(R) = 0. Since S(R) = S(S),
then S(S) = 0 means that it lost its real meaning. Therefore there is no a perfect
quantum secret sharing scheme realizing an access structure Γ . 
Corollary 5 Let Γ ⊆ 2P be a quantum access structure and let A = A1 ∪ A2
denote the set of all unauthorized groups. Suppose that there exists a quantum
secret sharing scheme realizing the access structure Γ , then this scheme is perfect
if and only if A = A1, i.e., A2 = Φ.
By Theorem 4 and Corollary 5, we can obtain that if there exists a perfect
((k, n))-threshold quantum secret sharing scheme, then it follows that n = 2k −
1. This means when n < 2k − 1, there doesn’t exist a perfect ((k, n))-threshold
quantum secret sharing scheme under Definition 2.
By working with different quantum access structures we might discover that the
number of the schemes satisfying the above model is so less. In order to overcome
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the drawback, we weaken the security requirement of Definition 2, and give a
generalized definition of the quantum secret sharing scheme.
Definition 6 Let R be a reference system such that |RS〉 is a pure state. A
generalized quantum secret sharing protocol realizing a quantum access structure
Γ is a complete positive map which generates quantum shares from a quantum
secret ρS =
∑m−1
i=0 pi|i〉〈i| and distributes these shares among a set of players
P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, such that:
(a) Recoverability requirement: for all A ∈ Γ , we have that I(R : A) = I(R : S).
(b) Secrecy requirement: for all A /∈ Γ , we have that I(R : A) ≤ S(S).
Remark: A quantum secret sharing scheme is perfect if the inequality in the
condition (b) is replaced with I(R : A) = 0 for all A /∈ Γ . So it is easy that know
the previous definition, the perfect quantum secret sharing scheme, is a special
case of ours.
Theorem 7 A quantum secret sharing scheme realizing a quantum access struc-
ture Γ is a generalized scheme if and only if S(A) = S(A) for all A ∈ A2, where
A2 ⊆ A and A2 = {A ∈ A | ∀ B ∈ Γ A ∩B 6= Φ}.
Proof. Suppose that there is a generalized quantum secret sharing scheme
realizing an access structure Γ . If each A is in A2 ⊆ A, then we can have that
A ∈ A2 ⊆ A by Lemma 3. Hence we obtain that

I(R : A) = S(R) + S(A)− S(RA) ≤ S(S)
I(R : A) = S(R) + S(A)− S(RA) ≤ S(S)
(2)
Using the fact that the system RAA is in a pure state, it implies that S(A) = S(RA)
and S(A) = S(RA). Thus the equation S(A) = S(A) holds.
For the converse, if A ∈ A1, then A ∈ Γ . So we can get I(R : A) = 2S(S).
By calculating, we must have I(R : A) = 0 ≤ S(S). If A′ ∈ A2, then it implies
that A′ ∈ A2 ⊆ A by Lemma 3. As the system RAA′ is in a pure state, it implies
that S(A′) = S(RA′) and S(A′) = S(RA′). Thus we have that I(R : A′) = S(R) +
S(A′) − S(RA′) = S(R) + S(A′) − S(A′) = S(S), I(R : A′) = S(R) + S(A′) −
S(RA′) = S(R)+S(A′)−S(A′) = S(S). Hence this quantum secret sharing scheme
is generalized. 
4 The Analysis of Two Types of Quantum Access Structures
4.1 Threshold Schemes
In this section we analyse the important class of quantum access structures: the so-
called threshold schemes. From the previous analysis, it is not hard to find that our
definition is the general form of Definition 2, so the threshold schemes achieved by
Definition 2 also meet our definition such as ((k,2k−1))− threshold quantum secret
sharing scheme. However, there are some threshold schemes which can not meet
Definition 2 but satisfy our definition. For example, the (3,4)-threshold scheme
can be realized by generalized quantum secret sharing scheme, but it doesn’t do
using the perfect quantum secret sharing scheme. Next, we propose a quantum
secret sharing scheme realizing it and analyse the security for the unauthorized
sets A satisfying I(R : A) ≤ S(S) but I(R : A) 6= 0.
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Example 1 In this example, the quantum access structure is denoted by
Γ = {P1P2P3, P1P2P4, P1P3P4, P2P3P4}.
Distribution phase: Assuming that the secret ρS is an arbitrary two dimensional
quantum state, i.e., ρS =
1
2
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|). The distribution of quantum shares for
different participants is defined by an isometry map US : C
2 −→ C2⊗C2⊗C2⊗C2
US : α|0〉+ β|1〉 −→ α(|0000〉+ |1111〉) + β(|0011〉+ |1100〉)
We note that the operator US induces a completely positive map Λ = I ⊗ US . As
ρS is a completely mixed state, there exists a reference system R such that |RS〉 is
a pure state in HR⊗HS and |RS〉 = 1/
√
2(|00〉+ |11〉). Then the share distribution
rules are as follows:
|RÂ〉 = (I ⊗ US)|RS〉
=
1
2
(|00000〉+ |01111〉+ |10011〉+ |11100〉)
where Â = P.
Reconstruction phase: The secret can be reconstructed from any three of the
four shares. The players can make use of the controlled-U operation to reconstruct
the original secret. The controlled-U operation is as follows: if the control qubit
is |i〉, then the target qubit is changed from |ϕ〉 to Ui|ϕ〉; if the control qubits are
|i〉|j〉, then the target qubit is changed from |ϕ〉 to Uk|ϕ〉, where k = 2 − i⊕ j for
i, j ∈ {0, 1}, ⊕ is a modulo 2 addition, and U0 = U2 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, U1 =
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
Without loss of generality we take the first three shares which the players
P1, P3 and P4 hold. The other authorized sets also make use of this method to
reconstruct the quantum secret. The specific recovery circuit is shown in Fig. 1,
and the steps are as follows:
(i) When the particle of P3 is a control qubit and those of P1 and P4 are the
target qubits, they utilize the above controlled-U operation.
(ii) After they finish the step (i), the controlled-U operation is used again.
However, the two particles of P1 and P4 are the control qubits and that of P3 is a
target qubit.
After the process is finished, the state is changed to
(α|0〉+ β|1〉)⊗ (|010〉+ |110〉)
The new state now contains the secret and it means the players P1, P3 and P4 can
have the original secret ρS.
By the secrecy condition (b), we can have that if I(R : A) = 0 for A in A, then
it implies that the unauthorized sets have no information on the secret. However,
there exist some unauthorized sets A such that I(R : A) ≤ S(S) but I(R : A) 6= 0.
For these unauthorized sets, we give a simple security analysis. Without loss of
generality we take the unauthorized sets P2P3 and P1P2, and the others can be
analyzed using the same method. In addition, since the players may take many
measures to recover the secret, we give a case to facilitate the analysis.
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Fig. 1 The quantum circuit for the recovery of the participants P1, P3 and P4 is shown, where
Ui, Uk ∈ {U0, U1, U2}.
First, we consider the unauthorized set P2P3. The quantum state can be rewrit-
ten as
α(|0000〉+ |1111〉) + β(|1100〉+ |0011〉)
= (α|00〉+ β|11〉)|00〉+ (α|11〉+ β|00〉)|11〉
It is easy to find that the particle of P2 is entangled with the P1. The players
P2 and P3 carry out several operations on their particles, but they don’t change
the entanglement between the particle of P2 and the particle of P1 because of the
symmetry of this quantum state. Thus P2 and P3 cannot have that (α|0〉+ β|1〉)
from the entangled state and it means that the players P2 and P3 cannot have any
information about the original secret.
Second, let us analyze the unauthorized set P1P2. Assuming that P1 and P2
make full use of the controlled-NOT gate. If the particle of P1 is a control qubit
and that of P2 is a target qubit, then the state is charged to
α(|0000〉+ |1111〉) + β(|0011〉+ |1100〉)
−→ α(|0000〉+ |1011〉) + β(|0011〉+ |1000〉)
= (α|0〉+ β|1〉)|0〉|00〉+ (α|1〉+ β|0〉)|0〉|11〉
At the moment, the player P2 measures his particle 2 with the basis {|0〉, |1〉}.
If the player P2 chooses the operator |1〉〈1| to measure his particle, then the P1
can have no information. If the player P2 chooses the measurement operator |0〉〈0|
, then the P1 can have the collapse state on his own particle, that is, [(α|0〉 +
β|1〉)|00〉+ (α|1〉 + β|0〉)|11〉]134 (the coefficient is neglected). Obviously, the new
quantum state is still entangled and it means that P1 and P2 cannot have any
information from this entangled state.
Through this simple security analysis, we can have that the scheme is secure
to the unauthorized sets that satisfy I(R : A) ≤ S(S) and I(R : A) 6= 0. Thus our
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definition, a generalized quantum secret sharing model, is reasonable and mean-
ingful.
4.2 Hyperstar Quantum Access Structures
In the preceding section, we introduce the threshold scheme. Each participant
holding the secret share in the threshold scheme is equal, i.e., each participant
weight is equal. In real life, however, there is always a case that certain partic-
ipant weight is not equivalent such as company employees between upper and
lower weight. Assuming that the players P1 and P2 together can get the origi-
nal information, but P1,P3 and P4 work together to recover the information. It is
obvious that the weight of P2 is greater than that of P3 or P4. Thus we analyse
another kind of quantum access structure in this section. At first, we know that
each quantum access structure corresponds to a hypergraph, and the hyperstar is
a kind of special hypergraph. Thus in this section we mainly study how to use the
generalized quantum secret sharing scheme to realize hyperstar quantum access
structures, and analyze all non isomorphic hyperstar quantum access structures
with at most 5 participants. To begin with, we propose the following results.
Result 1 Let B be a subset of players P = {P1, . . . , Pn}(n ≥ 3), and let Γ ⊆ 2P
be a quantum access structure and Γ = {E1, E2, . . . Ek, Fk+1 . . . Fm}, where Ei =
{Pl} ∪ B for any Pl ∈ B = P − B and Fj = {Pl′} ∪ B for any Pl′ ∈ B. Then there
is a generalized quantum secret sharing scheme realizing Γ .
The construction of the quantum secret sharing scheme is as follows for Result 1.
Without loss of generality we take the subset B = {P1, P2}, then B = {P3, . . . , Pn}.
Thus the quantum access structure is denoted by
Γ =
{
P1P2P3, . . . , P1P2Pn, P1P3 . . . Pn, P2P3 . . . Pn
}
.
Distribution phase: In order to share distribution, an isometry map is defined as
US : C
2 −→ C2n = C2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ C2
US : α|0〉+ β|1〉 −→ α(|000 · · · 0〉+ |111 · · · 1〉) + β(|110 · · · 0〉+ |001 · · · 1〉)
Using the previous method to Example 1 we can verify this scheme meets recov-
erability requirement and secrecy condition in Definition 6.
Reconstruction phase: The secret can be reconstructed from any authorized set
in Γ . The players can carry out several measurements on their particles and then
utilize the classical communication to tell the results to the others. Before the
recovery, the quantum state can be rewritten as
α(|000 · · · 0〉+ |111 · · · 1〉) + β(|110 · · · 0〉+ |001 · · · 1〉)
= (α|00〉+ β|11〉)|0 · · · 00〉+ (α|11〉+ β|00〉)|1 · · · 11〉
= |00〉(α|0 · · · 00〉+ β|1 · · · 11〉) + |11〉(α|1 · · · 11〉+ β|0 · · · 00〉)
If we take the authorized set such as {P1P2Pi}(i = 3, . . . , n), the steps are as
follows:
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(i) Firstly, the player Pi carries out several measurements on his particle
in the basis of {|0〉, |1〉}. At the same time, the P1 and P2 can get the col-
lapse states on his own particle, that is
[
(α|00〉 + β|11〉)|0 · · · 0〉]
12...i−1i+1...n
or[
(α|11〉+ β|00〉)|1 · · · 1〉]
12...i−1i+1...n
(the coefficient is neglected).
(ii) After the player Pi carries out the measurement, he tells the results of
measurement to P1 and P2 via a classical channel. According to the classical in-
formation the P1 and P2 can adopt a series of appropriate unitary operations on
their particles. At last, the state is changed to
[
(α|0〉 + β|1〉)|0 · · · 0〉.] Thus they
can reconstruct the original secret ρS.
If we take the authorized set such as {PlP3 . . . Pn}(l = 1, 2), the players can
make use of this above method to obtain the secret, but at this time P1 or P2 has
to carry out the corresponding measurements on his particle.
And then let us verify the perfection of the generalized scheme.
(a) By calculating, we have that I(R : S) = 2, S(R) = S(S) = 1. In addition,
without loss of generality we take some authorized sets A12i = {P1P2Pi}(i =
3, . . . , n) and A13...n = {P1P3 . . . Pn} in the quantum access structure Γ , and we
have that
I(R : A12i) = I(R : S) = 2; I(R : A13...n) = I(R : S) = 2.
(b) For all A ∈ A = A1 ∪A2, we take some unauthorized sets from A1 and A2 and
have that
(i) I(R : A) = 0 ≤ S(S) for the unauthorized set A ∈ A1;
(ii)I(R : A′) = 1 = S(S) for the unauthorized set A′ ∈ A2 .
Using the previous method and calculating, we can verify that this scheme
meets recoverability requirement and secrecy condition in Definition 6. Therefore
we obtain a generalized quantum secret sharing scheme realizing Γ .
Result 2 Let Γ ⊆ 2P be a quantum access structure mentioned in the Result 1. If
a quantum access structure Γ ′ is isomorphic to Γ , then there exists a generalized
quantum secret sharing scheme realizing Γ ′.
Result 3 Suppose that B = {Pi}(i = 1, 2 . . . n) and the quantum access structure
Γ can be denoted as Γ = {PiP2, PiP3, . . . , PiPi−1, PiPi+1, . . . , PiPn}, then there
is a generalized quantum secret sharing scheme realizing Γ .
Next, we mainly analyze quantum access structures in the Table 1 and discuss
the existence of generalized quantum secret sharing scheme realizing them.
According to Theorem 4 and Corollary 5, we find that there are no perfect
quantum secret sharing schemes realizing these access structures in Table 1.
For those quantum access structures corresponding to No.2, No.4 and No.8 in
Table 1, as they are special quantum access structure of Result 3, we can know
that there are generalized quantum secret sharing schemes for them.
For those corresponding to No.1, No.3, No.6, No.7, No.12, No.15 and No.16
in Table 1, we can make use of the similar method to give the scheme. For con-
venience, we can take No.7 as an example. By Result 1, this quantum access
structure is denoted as Γ =
{
123,124,125,1345,2345
}
, then there exists a gener-
alized quantum secret sharing scheme realizing Γ , where i ∈ {1, 2 . . . , 5} represents
the ith particle in the quantum state (the significance of the following is the same
here). Using the presence of the scheme, the dealer can redistribute the particles
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Table 1 Hyperstar quantum access structure with at most five participants
the Number of participants No. Hyperstar quantum access structure
2 1.
{
P1P2
}
2.
{
P1P2, P1P3
}
3 3.
{
P1P2P3
}
4.
{
P1P2, P1P3, P1P4
}
5.
{
P1P2P3, P1P4
}
4 6.
{
P1P2P3, P1P2P4
}
7.
{
P1P2P3P4
}
8.
{
P1P2, P1P3, P1P4, P1P5
}
9.
{
P1P2, P1P3, P1P4P5
}
10.
{
P1P2, P1P3P4, P1P3P5
}
11.
{
P1P2, P1P3P4P5
}
5 12.
{
P1P2P3, P1P2P4, P1P2P5
}
13.
{
P1P2P3, P1P4P5
}
14.
{
P1P2P3, P1P2P4P5
}
15.
{
P1P2P3P4, P1P2P3P5
}
16.
{
P1P2P3P4P5
}
2,3,4,and 5 to the participants P1,P2,P3 and P4. Obviously, the four participants
can obtain the original secret by their cooperation.
For those corresponding to No.5, No.11 and No.13 in Table I, by Result
1, we can obtain that when the quantum access structure is denoted as Γ ={
1234,1235,1236,1456,2456,3456
}
, there exists a generalized quantum secret shar-
ing scheme realizing Γ . Since the presence of the scheme, in order to realize the
quantum access structure corresponding to No.5, the dealer can send the particles
1 and 4 to the player P1, the particles 2 and 3 to P2, the particle 5 to P3 and the
particle 6 to P4. Similarly, for that corresponding to No.11 we can make use of
the same method to construct the scheme. For that corresponding to No.13, the
dealer will send the particles 1 and 4 to the player P1, the particle 2 to P2, the
particle 3 to P3, the particle 5 to P4 and the particle 6 to P5.
For that corresponding to No.14 in Table 1, by Result 1, we can obtain that
when the quantum access structure is denoted as Γ =
{
1234,1235,1236,1237,14567,
24567,34567
}
, there exists a generalized quantum secret sharing scheme realizing
Γ . Through the scheme, in order to realize the quantum access structure corre-
sponding to No.14 the dealer can send the particles 1 and 5 to the player P1, the
particles 2 and 4 to the player P2, the particle 3 to P3, the particle 6 to P4 and
the particle 7 to P5.
However, we cannot propose the quantum secret schemes realizing the two
quantum access structures corresponding to No.9 and No.10 in Table 1.
By Table 2, it is shown that the number of the quantum access structures
realized by generalized quantum secret sharing schemes is more than that of perfect
quantum secret sharing schemes.
As we weaken the security requirements in Definition 6, are the schemes satisfy-
ing the definition secure? Here we give a simple security analysis for the generalized
quantum secret sharing scheme corresponding to No.4.
Example 2 In this example, the quantum access structure is denoted by Γ =
{P1P2, P1P3, P1P4}. By the Result 3, there exists a generalized quantum secret
sharing scheme realizing Γ .
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Table 2 The scheme comparison between perfect quantum secret sharing scheme (PQSS) and
generalized quantum secret sharing scheme (GQSS).
the Number of participants No. PQSS GQSS
2 1. × √
2. × √
3 3. × √
4. × √
5. × √
4 6. × √
7. × √
8. × √
9. × ?
10. × ?
11. × √
5 12. × √
13. × √
14. × √
15. × √
16. × √
We obtain that when I(R : A) = 0 for all A /∈ Γ , the unauthorized sets have
no information about the secret and it implies that the scheme is secure. However,
in this scheme there are some unauthorized sets A such that I(R : A) ≤ S(S)
but I(R : A) 6= 0. Assuming that the members of unauthorized set P2P3P4 want
to obtain the secret, they will take various methods to destroy the entanglement.
However, it is hard to make the entangled state become a separable state since
the particle of P1 is always entangled with the one of P2,P3 and P4. If they cannot
get that α|0〉 + β|1〉, it means that they cannot have any information about the
secret. Through the above analysis, it is shown that this scheme is safe.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we mainly propose a generalized quantum information theoretical
model for quantum secret sharing. In order to give this model, we firstly anal-
yse the properties of the quantum access structures and the quantum adversary
structures, and discuss the perfect quantum secret sharing model introduced by
A. C. A. Nascimento. Then we give an important results about the quantum ac-
cess structures and find that the previous model has some limitations for many
quantum access structures. Thus we propose a generalized quantum secret sharing
model. Furthermore, we analyze two kinds of special quantum access structures to
illustrate the existence and rationality of the generalized quantum secret sharing
schemes. The first type access structures are the hyperstar quantum access struc-
tures. The second ones are the so-called threshold schemes. As our definition is
a generalization of the previous model, then the quantum secret sharing schemes
satisfying the previous definition still meet our requirements. By comparison, we
find that our model will be more practical and reasonable as more quantum access
structures are realized by quantum secret sharing schemes than before. In addi-
tion, by examples we analyze the security of the scheme and find that the scheme
is secure.
A Generalized Information Theoretical Model for Quantum Secret Sharing 13
Although our model has been greatly improved, there are still some problems
such as No.9 and No.10. Whether we may introduce some classical data to replace
the quantum ones and combined with the improving scheme in Ref.[18] to further
improve our generalized scheme. If this method can be successful, it is shown
that our generalized quantum secret sharing scheme is great feasible. This is an
interesting question and we state the analysis of this question as a future research
topic.
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